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Hannibal and the Italian Cities
By Michael P. Fronda
Department of Classical Studies
2002 Association of Ancient Historians Annual
Meeting
Rome's victory in the Second Punic
War paved the way for her conquest of the
Mediterranean. Yet that victory is bound up
with Hannibal's failure in Italy, even though
he brought Rome to her knees in the early
stages of the war. Previous explanations for
the failure of Hannibal's strategy have
tended to stress either the hopelessness of
this strategy, because of the loyalty of Rome's
Italian allies and their willingness to be
integrated into the Roman system, or the
success of Rome's counter-strategy of
attrition, aimed at limiting allied revolts
while wearing down Hannibal's forces (see J.
Lazenby in T.J. Cornell, et al., The Second
Punic War: A Reappraisal; the debate
fundamentally framed by G. De Sanctis,
Storia dei Romani 3.2). Previous scholarship,
however, neglects an important dimension of
the question of the failure of Hannibal's
strategy; that is, the significance of local
conditions, especially local diplomacy and
inter-municipal rivalries in shaping the
course of the war. Ultimately, Hannibal's
strategy was incapable of dealing with the
complex matrix of local diplomatic ties and
rivalries.
The following example will prove
suggestive. Naples and Nola, two cities with
close diplomatic ties, had a history of
hostility toward Rome, fighting against her
during the Second Samnite War. However,
both cities remained loyal to Rome during
the Second Punic War, despite repeated
overtures by Hannibal. Meanwhile Capua,
with a history of loyalty to Rome dating to
the Samnite Wars, and enjoying the
privileged status of civitas sine suffragio,
rebelled to Hannibal during the Second
Punic War. Capua was a regional hegemonic
power (M. Frederiksen, Campania), and the
argument that convinced the Capuan senate
to rebel was that an alliance with Hannibal
would yield an extension of Capuan territory
and power (Liv. 23.6.1, 10.2). After rebelling,
Capua attempted - without Hannibal's
assistance - to capture Cumae (Liv, 23.35.1-
19), and the people of Nola requested a
Roman garrison specifically for fear of an
attack by the Capuans (Liv. 23.19.4). These
events suggest that the decision of a city to
remain loyal to Rome or to revolt was rooted,
at least partly, in local diplomatic concerns.
In effect, by gaining Capua as an ally,
Hannibal may have strengthened the loyalty
of other Campanian cities fearing Capuan
aggression. Second, Capua and Nola-Naples
consistently opposed each other in different
conflicts from 4th through 3rd centuries,
regardless of their relationship with Rome
during those conflicts. This suggests that
some inter-municipal rivalries were long
lasting, and persisted well after initial Roman
conquest.
The evidence for inter-municipal
rivalry is the most clear for Campanian cities;
however, similar patterns of local rivalry are
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visible selsewhere in Italy, especially in
Apulia and Magna Graecia. By shifting the
focus of the war from Rome or Hannibal to
local conditions, the Second Punic War, with
its significant corpus of ancient evidence, can
be used as a window for exploring local
municipal concerns generally overshadowed
in the sources.
